This position is justified using mathematical theories of social choice. On one hand, Hazelrigg (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) argues that defining a “best” rational design (i.e., one that maximize some utility function) requires attending only to a single decision-maker (a “dictator”). Thus, the “preferred” design may differ across these elements.Ī considerable body of work has examined the impact of differing preferences on design. Similarly, a design which aims to best fulfill one requirement may not perform adequately on other requirements. Stakeholders may not agree on the characteristics of the best design that is, their preferences may differ. Taken together, these results show how axiomatic consistency can be combined with empirical correspondence to determine the circumstances under which “dictators” are necessary in design decisions.ĭesign often requires balancing the competing needs of multiple stakeholders or design requirements. Next, an empirical case study demonstrates how anigrafs may be extracted from survey data, and a model selection technique is introduced to examine the goodness-of-fit of these anigrafs to preference data. Simulation results show that even minimal amounts of structure can vastly reduce the likelihood of irrational outcomes at the level of the group, and that slightly stronger restrictions yield probabilities of irrational preferences that never exceed 5%. This formalism allows for a computational assessment of the likelihood of irrational outcomes. These restrictions are represented using “anigrafs”-structured relationships between alternatives that are represented using a graph–theoretic formalism. Axiomatic approaches can be informed by empirically motivated restrictions on the way that individuals can order their preferences.
This paper demonstrates that these approaches need not be mutually exclusive. In contrast, proponents of heuristic approaches observe that aggregate decisions are frequently made in practice, and argue that this widespread usage justifies the value of these heuristics to the engineering design community. This has led some to conclude that a single “dictator” is required to make design decisions. However, leading axiomatic approaches to decision-based design suggest that combining preferences across these elements is virtually guaranteed to result in irrational outcomes. Taken together, these results show how axiomatic consistency can be combined with empirical correspondence to determine the circumstances under which "dictators" are necessary in design decisions.ĭesign decisions often require input from multiple stakeholders or require balancing multiple design requirements. These restrictions are represented using "anigrafs"-structured relationships between alternatives that are represented using a graph-theoretic formalism. This has led some to conclude that a single "dictator" is required to make design decisions. Design decisions often require input from multiple stakeholders or require balancing multiple design requirements.
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